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‘RACIONALIDADE, CRENÇA, DESEJO – A MOTIVAÇÃO PARA A ACÇÃO DO PONTO DE VISTA DA TEORIA DA MENTE’
The Project’s ultimate goal is obtaining a general philosophical theory of rationality, understood as (i) a description or characterization of the factors at play on occasions when agents pass from certain beliefs to others, add or eliminate beliefs from their corpus of beliefs, or opt for a course of action from several alternatives, based on a set of beliefs, (ii) a set of hypotheses on the way in which we decide from criteria of correction when we talk of justifying or the rationality of beliefs and actions, (iii) a set of hypotheses on the reasons for why we want to know (if indeed we do) if our beliefs are true and our reasoning and actions rational. This should be done within analytic philosophy and cognitive science. The ultimate aim of this project is explore a comparison between approaches to rationality within the analytical philosophical tradition and other philosophical traditionapproaches.
Subjacent to this ultimate goal is the conviction that it is necessary to make explicit the intersection of the definition of ‘rationality’ as an appropriation of a given end with the definition of ‘rationality’ associated with the results of explicit reasoning. This conviction is linked to the idea (which we can call pragmatist) that it is justified to consider certain agents’ movements of thought (i.e., reasoning, inferences) as actions.
Apart for the above-mentioned general theory of rationality, we hope that a result of this project, in ‘intra-philosophical’ terms, will be the characterization of the relations between logic, philosophy of mind and philosophy of knowledge, as well as a more explicit relationship between scientific studies on cognition and epistemology.
Pursuing the final objective starts, in a first stage, with analyses of rationality, belief and desire as aspects of the mind, from several approaches (scientific, philosophical and logical).
More specifically, the project involves (1) a characterization of standard models of rationality (theory of decisions, theory of games), (2) mapping of objections to these standard models, based on studies of cognition from different domains, (3) characterization of the relations between logic and the idea of rationality, the discussion of the differences between ‘reasoning’ and ‘argument’, the problematic involving the idea of ‘a universal acceptance of logic’, (4) the analysis of rationality from the viewpoint of the evolutionist theory as one more adaptive feature with ‘function’ and ‘purpose’, (5) the analysis of the relations between the language of rationality and the mechanisms of cognition, and, correlatively, the problematic surrounding the status of the suppositions of rationality in philosophy of mind (Quine, Davidson, Dennet), (6) the analysis of the ‘co-evolution’ of internal cognitive devices and the interpretative behaviour of agents (psychology of common sense, mind-reading), (7) characterization of the volitive and desire dimension of mental life in their relation with the theory of belief (Dretske 2000).
These characterizations and analyses should converge in (8) the selection and characterization of philosophical theories of rationality. Especially under consideration and discussion are the theories of rationality defended by S. Blackburn (Blackburn 1998), S. Stich (Stich 1990), R. Nozick (Nozick 1993), C. Cherniak (Cherniak 1986) e F. Gil (Gil 1993, Gil 2000), respectively, a human-expressivist theory, a theory of fragmentation of reason, a theory of symbolic rationality, a theory of minimum rationality, a theory of comprehension and intelligibility.
Based on the latter author, the project assumes the need, in a general theory of rationality, of a phenomenology of epistemic notions, such as evidence, proof and conviction, as well as the importance of making more explicit the affective / volitive dimension of the spirit in its relation with the represented contents.
The researchers involved in this project (those included in the core team, the invited researchers and consultants) will work from different presuppositions and within the scope of different disciplinary approaches of cognition and reasoning, so as to obtain a final comparative perspective. It is our intention that this perspective serve as a contribution of philosophy to the different disciplines of cognition, thus situating the conceptual and normative analysis of philosophy among the cognitive sciences.
Rationality has for millennia been considered the mark of the human. However, although philosophers have continuously tried to characterize thought processes and logicians have, for over a century, sought to develop formal systems to capture the nature of valid inferences, it was the development of a theory of rational decision in the 20th century that instituted a dominant normative perspective, or at least a central reference, in studies on rationality. In the 20th century, the theory of rational choice became an axiom over 50 years ago in economics (Von Neumann e Morgentern 1947, Savage 1954), although, for example, F. Ramsey had previously elaborated a theory on partial belief and inconclusive reasoning based on a subjectivist theory of probability (Ramsey 1926). Furthermore, mathematicians like Pascal and Bernouilli had also, and much earlier on (17th, 18th centuries), sought to conceive the relations between agents and goods or values in situations of alternative choice in terms of probabilities.
According to the theory of rational decision, which intends to be neutral relative to any psychological and philosophical assumptions about the mind, that which characterizes the behaviour of rational agents in situations of choice is the maximization of expected utility. Several scientific disciplines, especially economics and biology, use models of the rational decision-maker in their theories. What we have to find out is if the idea of a neutral description of a rational decision situation (when confronted with mind contents and motivational characterizations) can be defended. The issue at hand is what does in fact make an agent act and it is here that the present project is positioned.
It is worth noting for example that when the Greeks characterised Man as a rational animal, they did not consider rationality as one more evolutionary adaptation in the animal species that we are. However, today we have good reasons to think that this is so (Sober 1994 a, 1994b, 1994c, 1994d, 1994e). Note also that when the theorists of rational decision characterise the decision processes in terms of usefulness functions, that do not take into consideration general positions on the nature of mind (as for example that of D. Hume), according to which reason is a slave of passions, and does not in itself possess any type of motivational force (Blackburn 1998).
For these reasons, which have the underlying problem of the relations between the representative and volitive dimensions of the mind, together with the fact that the theory of rational decision is a formal, abstract characterisation, made from a ‘top-to-bottom’ perspective and not ‘bottom-to-top’ (i.e., based on a theory of, for example, the mind’s neuronal mechanisms) of that which makes up the behaviour of an agent, its relevance for the cognitive sciences is problematic. Thus, several criticisms did in fact appear over the last few decades, especially after empirical studies of cognition that revealed the contrast between the theory of decision and the agents’ real behaviour. Especially relevant are studies by the psychologist A. Tversky (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, Tversky and Kahneman 1982, Tversky and Kahneman 1993), who described how the formal requisites of rationality – relative to agents’ preferences and choices – within the theory of decision are violated by people’s behaviour. Furthermore, studies like those by H. Simon on limited rationality, characteristic of agents with finite resources, like for example, humans, which sustain that decisions are not and cannot be the best possible as they are only sufficiently good (a process of satisfying would thus be a more realistic characterisation than the idea of maximisation) (Simon 1982,Cherniak 1986).
In analytical philosophy, the study of rational decision was closely linked with philosophy of action and analysis of paradoxes and dilemmas, such as the dilemma of the prisoner and the problem of Newcomb (Nozick 1993). An analysis of the application of the idea of rational decision to ethics led to such important milestones as the study of D. Pazrfit on the auto-defeating character of rational egotism (Parfit 1984). However, in practice, assumptions on rationality continue to be fundamental in an important lineage of contemporary philosophy of mind (Quine, Davidson, Dennett).
Thus, we feel that there is a need for a general theory of rationality that relates the so-called rational behaviour of agents with a more explicit characterization of the nature of the mind underlying this behaviour. It is important that one has a standing on issues like the following: are we irrational or does cognition function according to principles that differ from those the formal models of rational decision assume? Is real rationality a heuristic rationality, which lacks the coherence of notion present in the rational decision theory? Are other aspects of the mind or spirit, apart from representation and calculation, (namely a dimension of desire) involved in that which we call rationality and which motivate us to action?
It is this which philosophers like S. Stich (Stich 1993), and S. Blackburn (Blackburn 1998) attempt. the title itself reveals our position on the questions at hand, that is, that we should consider aspects of the mind or spirit, apart from representation and calculation (especially a dimension of desire) involved in that we call rationality and which motivate us to action and thought. Consequently, our basic assumptions are the following: (i) it is difficult or impossible to interpret empirical data on rationality (they are themselves largely a result of the application of theoretical models) without a theory of mind and without a theory of normativity, crucial in a discussion of ‘rationality’, (ii) that which is done when we talk of rationality is open to several interpretations (normative, descriptive, prescriptive).
Consequently, in studies on rationality we find a traditional field in philosophy – it would be hard if not impossible to name on philosopher who had not thought about the processes of thought and on the motivation for action – in which cognition sciences enter and which, for this very reason, require a new philosophy. A large majority of the authors whose works can be considered an answer to this challenge (Nozick 1993, Blackburn 19998, Harman 1996, Stich 1993) work in the field of analytical philosophy and are not particularly concerned in characterising a dimension of the issue which we call the relation between the subject and knowledge. It is our conviction that there is a lack of a phenomenology of the epistemic notions with which we view rationality and its products (notions like belief, evidence, proof, conviction, etc.). it is our intention to develop an approach to this essential aspect of a theory of rationality based on the work of F. Gil (Gil 1986, Gil 1993, 2000), who not only is positioned in analytical philosophy but also includes the thought of authors like Husserl, Freud and Kant, usually ignored by the former. The pertinence of a study of F. Gil’s work in this context is further enhanced by the interest that we think results from studying the work of a contemporary Portuguese philosopher.
From all the factors mentioned, a frame of comparison appears that is our ultimate objective and which ultimately seeks to evaluate more or less rationalist concepts from that which is generally understood as rationality, within a general theory of the mind or spirit, which we do not intend be apriorist but on the contrary is based on contributions from several cognition sciences.
Paulo Tunhas, UFP-Porto
Maria Luísa Couto Soares, FCSH-UNL
Júlio Campos, Hospital de São João, FLUP
Juliocampos@netc.pt
Sara Bizarro, FLUL
Daniel Amaro, FLUP
Pedro Galvão, FLUL
galv@clix.pt
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Cambridge
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge CB3 9DA UK
0044.1223.335095
swb24@cam.ac.uk
STEPHEN STICH
Board of Governors Professor
Department of Philosphy and Center for Cognitive Science
Davidson Hall / Douglass Campus
Rutgers University
26 Nichol Avenue
New Brunswick NJ 08901-2882 USA
732-932-9091
Board of Governors Professor
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
Department of Philosophy
26 Nichol Avenue
New Brunswick NJ 08901
732-932-9861
FAX 732-932-8617
Center for Cognitive Science
152 Frelinghuysen Road
Piscataway, NJ
732-445-0635
FAX 732-445-6715
goldman@philosophy.rutgers.edu
1. Departamento de Lóxica e Filosofia da Ciencia - Filosofia do Dereito, Moral e Política
Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
Facultade de Filosofía
Campus Sur
15706 Santiago de Compostela
Espanha
Juan Vazquez Sanchez
Concha Martinez Vidal
Jose Luís Falguera
Editora: Sara Bizarro
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PROJECTO DE INVESTIGAÇÃO (apresentado no GFMC no 1º semestre 2003)- Versão portuguesa
‘RACIONALIDADE, CRENÇA, DESEJO – A MOTIVAÇÃO PARA A ACÇÃO DO PONTO DE VISTA DA TEORIA DA MENTE’
(Rationality, Belief, Desire- motivation for action from the point of view of the theory of mind)
O projecto apresentado tem como intenção estabelecer uma comparação entre abordagens da racionalidade no âmbito da tradição filosófica analítica e no âmbito de outras abordagens filosóficas. O seu objectivo final é a obtenção de uma teoria filosófica geral da racionalidade, entendida como (i) uma descrição ou caracterização dos factores em jogo nas ocasiões em que agentes passam de determinadas crenças para outras crenças, adicionam ou eliminam crenças do seu corpo de crenças, ou optam, a partir de um conjunto de crenças, por um curso de acção por entre várias alternativas, (ii) um conjunto de hipóteses acerca da forma como decidimos entre critérios de correcção quando falamos da justificação ou racionalidade de crenças e acções, (iii) um conjunto de hipóteses acerca das razões por que queremos saber (se de facto queremos) se as nossas crenças são verdadeiras e os nossos raciocínios e acções racionais.
Subjacente ao objectivo final está a convicção de que é necessário cruzar a definição instrumental de ‘racionalidade’ como apropriação a uma dada finalidade e a definição de ‘racionalidade’ associada aos resultados de raciocínio explícito. A uma tal convicção está ligada a ideia (a que se pode chamar pragmatista) de que se justifica a consideração de determinados movimentos de pensamento de agentes (i.e raciocínios, inferências) como acções.
Para além da acima mencionada teoria geral da racionalidade pretende-se que decorra deste projecto, em termos ‘intra-filosóficos’, uma caracterização das relações entre lógica, teoria da mente e teoria do conhecimento, bem como a explicitação das relações entre estudos científicos da cognição e epistemologia.
A prossecução do objectivo final assumirá, em termos de realização, numa primeira fase, a forma de análises da racionalidade, da crença e do desejo como aspectos do mental a partir de abordagens diversas (científicas, filosóficas e lógicas).
Em termos específicos, o projecto envolve (1) a caracterização de modelos standard da racionalidade (teoria da decisão, teoria dos jogos), (2) o mapeamento de objecções a esses modelos standard a partir de estudos da cognição provenientes de vários quadrantes, (3) a caracterização das relações da lógica /lógicas com a ideia de racionalidade, a discussão das diferenças entre raciocínio e argumento e a problematização da ideia de ‘uma aceitação universal da lógica’, (4) a análise da racionalidade do ponto de vista da teoria evolucionista como mais um traço adaptativo com ‘função’ e ‘propósito’ determinados, função e propósito a serem concebidos de acordo com os princípios aplicáceis em geral aos produtos resultantes de um processo de evolução por selecção natural, a ‘co-evolução’ de dispositivos cognitivos internos e do comportamento interpretativo dos agentes (psicologia de senso-comum, mindreading), (5) a relação da linguagem da racionalidade com os mecanismos da cognição, e correlativamente a análise do estatuto das suposições de racionalidade na filosofia da mente (Quine, Davidson, Dennett), (6) a caracterização da dimensão voliitva e de desejo da vida mental (7) a selecção e caracterização de teorias filosóficas da racionalidade, quer do âmbito da filosofia analítica. Relativamente a (5) serão, nomeadamente, analisadas e discutidas as teorias da racionalidade defendidas por S. Blackburn, S. Stich, R. Nozick, C. Cherniak e F. Gil, respectivamente um’a teoria humeana-expressivista, uma teoria da fragmentação da razão, uma teoria da racionalidade simbólica, uma teoria da racionalidade mínima, uma teoria da compreensão e da inteligibilidade.
A partir deste último autor o projecto assume a necessidade, numa teoria geral da racionalidade de uma fenomenologia de noções epistémicas tais como evidência, prova e convicção, bem como a importância da explicitação da dimensão afectiva / volitiva do espírito na sua relação com os conteúdos representados.
Os investigadores envolvidos no projecto (quer os pertencentes à equipa básica, quer os convidados, quer os consultores) trabalharão a partir de diferentes pressupostos e no âmbito de diferentes abordagens disciplinares da cognição e do pensamento de modo a obter a perspectiva comparativa final. Pretende-se que esta constitua uma contribuição da filosofia às várias disciplinas da cognição, situando a análise conceptual e nomativa da filosofia na continuidade das ciências cognitivas.
Página actualizada a 12-03-2011 @ 10:41
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