teste

PI: Mattia Riccardi
Other research team members: Ana Pinheiro; Frank Laroi
Funding: 29.500€
Institution: Fundação Bial
Ref.: 
Dates: 2013-2015
 Keywords:
Hallucinations: definition, phenomenology, aetiology; Disjunctivism; Insight and pseudohallucinations; Perceptual vividness: metacognition vs. attention.
ABSTRACT
Hallucinations are a lingering concern for philosophers and psychologists alike. On the one hand, from a philosopher,s viewpoint they represent the paramount case of epistemic disquietude. On the other hand, clinicians and experimental psychologists studying mental disorders often encounter them too. In recent years, however, interest in the problem of hallucinations has become more intense than ever. In philosophy, the recent revival of naïve realism under the label of disjunctivism has revitalized the philosophical debate surrounding hallucinations (see [7], [16], [23]). Similarly, the empirical investigation of hallucinations has been an important trend in psychology - in a broad sense - in recent decades [1]. This is largely due to the impressive development of neuro-imaging techniques which have permitted to gather a much deeper insight into the neurobiological underpinnings of such mental phenomena. Unfortunately, philosophers and psychologists concerned with hallucinatory phenomena have rarely shown interest in each other,s work (a rare exception is LarALia10). On the one hand, reference to empirical findings is scarce within the disjunctivism discussion. On the other hand, psychologists give less attention to the conceptual work brought about by philosophers in order to clarify the nature of different kinds of mental events. Accordingly, lack of cross-fertilization between the two areas is the main motivation of this project. Therefore, the general proposal we put forward consists in promoting a multidisciplinary approach to the problem of hallucination as the most appropriate strategy. This key idea will be articulated along three main axes:
A) Conceptual puzzles for psychologists: The different theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches adopted in investigating hallucinatory phenomena have made it difficult to provide not only a widely accepted classification (see [6] for auditory hallucinations), but even a non-contentious definition of them (see [25], [19], [1], [5]). Furthermore, psychological literature often fails to specify criteria which enable to clearly distinguish hallucinations from other sensory events such as misperceptions, illusions, imagery phenomena and even dreams. 
B) Empirical puzzles for philosophers: Common to the many versions of disjunctivism that can be found in related literature is the idea that there is a fundamental discontinuity between perceptions and hallucinations: there is no common factor which is shared by these two classes of mental phenomena. However, cognitive and neurobiological models typically treat perceptions and hallucinations as being realized in the same functional and anatomical systems. This claim, at least prima facie, contrasts with the discontinuity assumption which is most central to disjunctivism. This tension opens up several questions. How can the view suggested by cognitive and neurobiological models be articulated so as to challenge disjunctivism? And how can disjunctivists defend their core thesis taking into account the functional and anatomical convergence suggested by the neurobiological findings?
C) The real puzzle: The phenomenology (phenomenal character) of hallucinatory experience still remains obscure. Particularly puzzling is its percept-like charachter [24], its misleading sense of reality [3]. Sometimes this character is described as Leibhaftigkeit [18], or ƒvividness. In the case of veridical perception, vividness is taken to indicate the fact that we are being presented with the objects in our surroundings. For instance, the vividness of my visual experience of my desk is typically the mark of the desk’s presence to me: it is the phenomenal property which gives perception its characteristic feeling of presence [10]. Therefore, the challenge presented by hallucination is how to explain vividness without presence.

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