

The Bounds of Judgement—Frege, cognitive agents and human thinkers (PTDC/FIL-FIL/109882/2009)

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What shape can our access to the inner take?
Can inner experience ever be an object of judgement? Or should we rather think of inner experience in terms of qualia? What, if anything, is wrong with the perceptual model of introspection? And if introspecting is not perceiving, can thinking about perception give us ideas to think about the conditions in which we access ourselves? How does the Frege-Wittgenstein case against idealism bear on conceptions of inner experience?

Starting from such questions we also want to explore ways conceptions of the first-person reflect on approaches to nature of action and morality.





